> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.frankieone.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Tags and Reasons reference > Reference list of all standard Tags (Reasons) available for classifying activities and resolving alerts in Transaction and Activity Monitoring. This page lists all standard Tags available in FrankieOne Transaction and Activity Monitoring. Tags are the API-level concept. In the FrankieOne Portal, they are presented as **Reasons**. When you [resolve an alert](/v2/docs/tm/implementation-resolve-reevaluate) or [classify an activity](/v2/docs/tm/classifying-activities-and-alerts), you select one or more Tags (Reasons) to record the outcome. The available Reasons in the Portal are filtered by the status you select: * **True Positive** statuses (True Positive: Accept, True Positive: Reject) show the true positive Reasons listed below. * **False Positive** shows the false positive Reasons. * **In Review** shows the in review Reasons. All Reasons are available regardless of alert category. For example, a fraud alert can be resolved with a money laundering Reason if the investigation supports it. Tags are managed by FrankieOne. You cannot create, rename, or delete Tags through the API. Only active Tags can be applied. ## True Positive True Positive Tags classify an activity or alert as confirmed or suspected fraudulent, suspicious, or high-risk. They are grouped by category. ### Money laundering | Tag | Reason | When to use | | :-------------------------- | :----------------------------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `ML_CASH_STRUCTURING` | Cash structuring or opacity | The customer is splitting cash deposits or withdrawals to stay below thresholds, or cash is being handled to hide ownership or origin through mules, third-party deposits, or mixing of funds. | | `ML_LAYERING` | Layering | An account is being used as a pass-through or mule to move funds and hide their origin. This includes rapid in-out movement, circular flows, fan-in/fan-out patterns with unrelated counterparties, crypto on/off-ramp or stablecoin layering, cash-to-crypto conversion via ATMs or digital currency exchanges, and placement or layering through gambling channels. | | `ML_IDENTITY_CRIME` | Identity crime | A stolen or fake identity has been used to open accounts, access funds, or bypass controls. | | `ML_DECEPTION` | Deception or misrepresentation | Fabricated or inconsistent documents have been used to make transactions look legitimate, the customer's stated source of funds conflicts with the actual transactions, or trade payments don't match business reality such as over/under invoicing or phantom shipments. | | `ML_FACILITATION` | Insider or professional facilitation | A staff member, trusted insider, or external professional is helping bypass controls, open accounts, or move funds. | | `ML_STRUCTURAL_CONCEALMENT` | Structural concealment | Shells, trusts, nominees, or unjustified complexity are being used to hide beneficial owners or control. This includes entities with no real operations used as pass-throughs, trust accounts used to mix funds, and proceeds integrated through luxury goods, vehicles, real estate, or bullion inconsistent with the customer's profile. | | `ML_DETECTION_AVOIDANCE` | Detection or sanctions avoidance | Unregulated channels, remitters, informal value transfer services, high-risk jurisdictions, or transaction patterns have been chosen to reduce visibility or circumvent sanctions outside the weapons of mass destruction or proliferation context. | | `ML_DRUG_PROCEEDS` | Drug trafficking proceeds | Funds are linked to narcotics trafficking or drug-related criminal activity. | | `ML_CORRUPTION` | Corruption or bribery proceeds | Funds are linked to corruption, bribery, or politically exposed person abuse of public office. | | `ML_TAX_CRIME` | Tax crime proceeds | Funds are linked to tax evasion or tax fraud. | | `ML_CYBER_CRIME` | Cyber-enabled crime proceeds | Proceeds of ransomware, business email compromise, or other cyber crime are being laundered. This covers the offender or proceeds side and is distinct from victim-facing scam or fraud codes. | | `ML_OTHER_PREDICATE` | Other predicate offense | Funds are linked to a designated predicate offense not covered by a specific code, including human trafficking, arms trafficking, environmental crime, kidnapping, or counterfeiting. Specify the predicate in case notes. | ### Fraud | Tag | Reason | When to use | | :--------------------- | :------------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | `FR_UNAUTHORIZED_CARD` | Unauthorized card fraud | There is a confirmed unauthorized card transaction, whether online (card-not-present) or physical (skimming, counterfeit, lost/stolen, or intercepted in mail). | | `FR_IDENTITY_TAKEOVER` | Identity takeover | Someone's identity has been captured and used to open accounts, credit lines, or products without their knowledge, or an account or product was opened through deception or misrepresentation at application. | | `FR_ACCOUNT_TAKEOVER` | Account takeover | A legitimate account has been taken over using stolen or compromised credentials. | | `FR_MALWARE` | Malware | Malware has been used to access accounts or redirect transactions without the victim knowing. | | `FR_PORTING` | Porting or SIM swap | Fraud resulted from phone number porting or a SIM swap. | | `FR_FIRST_PARTY` | First-party fraud | The customer intentionally disputes a legitimate transaction or claims it was unauthorized while they participated or benefited. | | `FR_PHISHING` | Phishing-led fraud | The victim was tricked into revealing credentials, sharing information, or authorizing a payment through phishing. | | `FR_ELDER_ABUSE` | Elder or vulnerable person abuse | There is evidence of financial exploitation of an elderly or vulnerable person by someone in a position of trust. | ### Scam | Tag | Reason | When to use | | :--------------------- | :--------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | `SC_RELATIONSHIP` | Relationship scam | The victim authorized payments because of relationship manipulation. | | `SC_INVESTMENT` | Investment scam | The victim authorized payments into a fake investment opportunity, including crypto schemes such as pig butchering, fake exchanges, or rug pulls. | | `SC_BUYING_SELLING` | Buying or selling scam | The victim paid for goods or services that were never delivered or don't exist. | | `SC_THREATS_EXTORTION` | Threat or extortion scam | The victim authorized payment because of threats, coercion, extortion, or a ransomware demand. | | `SC_JOB_EMPLOYMENT` | Job or employment scam | The victim authorized payments for a fake job or guaranteed income. This may also involve mule recruitment. | | `SC_UNEXPECTED_MONEY` | Unexpected money or winnings | The victim paid an upfront fee or shared information to claim a fake prize or windfall. | | `SC_IMPERSONATION` | Impersonation scam | The victim authorized payment or shared information because someone impersonated a trusted person or organization. | | `SC_PAYMENT_REDIRECT` | Payment redirection | A business was tricked into sending an invoice payment or urgent transfer to a fraudulent account. | | `SC_REMOTE_ACCESS` | Remote access scam | The victim installed remote-access software and was coached into transferring funds. | ### Terrorism financing | Tag | Reason | When to use | | :------------------------ | :----------------------------------- | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `TF_SELF_FUNDED` | Self-funding or supporter funds | A lone actor is self-funding, personal savings or small contributions from associates are being used to support terrorism, or outgoing transfers appear intended to support offshore terrorist organizations or affiliates. | | `TF_CHARITABLE_NPO` | Charitable or linked to NPO | Donations are presented as charity or mixed with legitimate displaced-person support but indicators suggest diversion to a terrorist nexus, or a non-profit organization appears set up, controlled, or exploited to support terrorist-linked individuals or organizations. | | `TF_ONLINE_ECOSYSTEM` | Online funding ecosystem | Payments are linked to social media fundraising, crowdfunding, communications platforms, or recruitment networks. | | `TF_INFORMAL_CHANNELS` | Informal or non-traditional channels | A de-risked actor or non-profit organization has shifted to cash couriering, hawala-like channels, unregistered remitters, or digital currency for raising, moving, or storing funds. | | `TF_CONDUIT_JURISDICTION` | Conduit jurisdiction | Funds are sent to a neighboring or conduit country and then likely moved physically into a conflict zone. | ### Proliferation financing | Tag | Reason | When to use | | :--------------- | :------------------------ | :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `PF_PROCUREMENT` | Proliferation procurement | Payments or trade finance are linked to procurement of dual-use or proliferation-sensitive goods, use of unwitting suppliers where payments look normal but end-use or end-user is illicit, or a state-linked procurement network targeting suppliers or financial services. | | `PF_EVASION` | Proliferation evasion | Funds are routed through third countries, trans-shipment hubs, front or shell entities, intermediaries, or professionals to hide the real parties or evade DPRK or Iran-related targeted financial sanctions. Also covers goods mislabeled or exported just under control or reporting thresholds to avoid export controls. | ## False Positive False Positive Tags record that an alert was reviewed and determined to be genuine or low-risk. | Tag | Reason | When to use | | :------------------------ | :---------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `FP_NOT_SUSPICIOUS` | Not suspicious | The activity is not suspicious for a reason not covered by the other false positive Reasons. This is also the default Reason when all true positive Reasons are removed from an activity. | | `FP_CONFIRMED_AUTHORIZED` | Customer confirmed authorized | The customer explicitly confirms they authorized the transaction and the purpose is legitimate. | | `FP_PLAUSIBLE_SOF` | Plausible source of funds or wealth | The customer provides a credible source of funds or wealth that explains the activity. | | `FP_ACTIVITY_EXPLAINED` | Activity explained by profile | The activity fits the known customer profile, risk appetite, established payee history, or declared business model. | | `FP_KNOWN_COUNTERPARTY` | Known counterparty | The counterparty identity is verified and the relationship or purpose is confirmed (for example, supplier, family, landlord). | | `FP_DOCUMENTARY_EVIDENCE` | Documentary evidence matches | Supporting documents (invoice, contract, purchase order, settlement statement) match the payee, amount, goods or services, and timeline. | | `FP_CRYPTO_SUPPORTED` | Declared crypto activity supported | The customer has declared crypto trading or investing and exchange records and source of funds support the activity. | | `FP_OWN_ACCOUNTS` | Own-account transfer | Transfers are between the same beneficial owner's accounts. | | `FP_REVERSED_VOIDED` | Payment reversed or voided | The alerted transaction was reversed or voided in the normal course of business. | ## In Review In Review Tags record that an alert is under active investigation and a final decision has not been reached. | Tag | Reason | When to use | | :------------------------- | :-------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `IR_PENDING_CUSTOMER_INFO` | Pending customer information | You need to contact the customer, are waiting for documents, or incomplete or outdated KYC data prevents a clear decision. | | `IR_LAW_ENFORCEMENT` | Law enforcement | The decision depends on law enforcement feedback, negative news, open-source intelligence, or external intelligence. | | `IR_REPORTING_DECISION` | Reporting decision | Pending a decision on whether to file a suspicious activity report (SAR), suspicious matter report (SMR), or equivalent. | | `IR_LINKED_CASE` | Linked alert or case pending | The outcome depends on another active fraud, AML, or scam alert or case that hasn't been finalized. | | `IR_SPECIALIST_ANALYSIS` | Specialist analysis in progress | Complex funds-flow analysis, network or graph mapping, multi-entity payment chain analysis, mule pattern monitoring, or cross-channel activity review is being performed by a technical specialist before determining an outcome. | | `IR_INTERNAL_ESCALATION` | Internal escalation | The alert has been escalated to a team leader, risk, or compliance team for review. This includes higher-risk countries, sanctions screening dependencies, complex customer structures, terrorism or proliferation financing red flags, internal misconduct indicators, scam coaching concerns, enhanced due diligence requirements, or borderline behavior needing policy clarification. | | `IR_AWAITING_EXTERNAL` | Awaiting external outcome | You are waiting on a response from another organization, payment provider, or card scheme, or waiting on the outcome of a funds recall, reversal, or recovery before deciding. | | `IR_VULNERABILITY` | Customer vulnerability assessment | Indicators of vulnerability (age, disability, language, bereavement) require specialist review before the case can be resolved. |